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The SOE reform in China/周大勇

作者:法律资料网 时间:2024-06-02 19:59:10  浏览:8350   来源:法律资料网
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The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.

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国家经济委员会、国家劳动总局、中华全国总工会关于贯彻执行国务院发布的《矿山安全条例》和《矿山安全监察条例》的通知

国家经委 国家劳动总局 等


国家经济委员会、国家劳动总局、中华全国总工会关于贯彻执行国务院发布的《矿山安全条例》和《矿山安全监察条例》的通知

1982年3月8日,国家经委、国家劳动总局、全国总工会

今年二月十三日,国务院以国发〔1982〕30号文发布了《矿山安全条例》和《矿山安全监察条例》。这两个条例是我国建国以来矿山安全工作的经验总结,是矿山企业安全生产的基本准则,也是劳动部门和工会组织对矿山安全工作进行监督检查的依据。为了认真贯彻执行这两个条例,尽快建立矿山安全监察制度,搞好矿山安全生产的正常秩序,保障矿山职工在生产过程中的安全健康,特作如下通知:
一、督促和协助矿山企业及其主管部门组织各级领导干部、工程技术人员和职工群众认真学习与研究两个条例,并且根据国务院通知的精神与两个条例的要求,检查对照目前存在的问题,订出具体贯彻执行的措施办法,由上而下地经常进行检查督促,保证实施。为此,要在今年上半年内,集中一段时间,组织学习这两个条例。在学习中,要结合贯彻中发〔1982〕2号、3号文件,有针对性地纠正本企业、本系统、本地区那些忽视安全生产,违章指挥、违章作业等现象,对照条例内容,向干部和群众进行一次安全生产的法制教育,以增强法制观念。特别是各级领导干部,都要牢固地树立起知法、遵法和依法办事的思想,为今后带头严格执行条例的规定打好基础。
二、国务院通知中明确指出:“今后,凡新建、改建、扩建的矿山,其劳动条件和安全卫生设施都必须符合条例的规定,否则不准投产。”这是做好矿山安全生产的基本措施之一,必须坚决执行。劳动部门和工会组织要严格按照《矿山安全条例》第十二、十三条的规定办理。对于原有矿山,要督促其主管部门结合企业整顿和技术改造,认真做好矿山的安全检查工作,提出贯彻《矿山安全条例》的实施细则。
三、为了迅速有效地贯彻执行这两个条例,必须加强劳动部门自身的建设,应按照《矿山安全监察条例》规定要求,迅速建立矿山安全监察机构,配备矿山安全监察人员。经国家编委同意,全国各地共配备矿山安全监察工作人员一千七百人。其中,矿山安全监察处二百七十人,矿山安全监察室(组)一千四百三十人(全国矿山安全监察人员名额分配方案,在去年山东烟台和济南会议上已告你们),各地可以分批分期组建,人员在三年内配齐,但是,今年内要配备百分之五十以上。
四、各级工会组织应该广泛地向职工进行宣传教育,使职工群众关心和监督条例的实施。要求广大职工领会《矿山安全条例》对本工种提出的安全技术要求,结合本企业的安全操作规程,做到遵章守纪,严格贯彻执行。同时向一切漠视和违反条例的行为进行监督和斗争。


金华市人民政府办公室关于转发市人事局金华市人才交流会管理办法(试行)的通知

浙江省金华市人民政府办公室


金华市人民政府办公室关于转发市人事局金华市人才交流会管理办法(试行)的通知

金政办发〔2007〕86号


各县(市、区)人民政府,市政府各部门:
市人事局制定的《金华市人才交流会管理办法(试行)》已经市人民政府同意,现转发给你们,请按照执行。

金华市人民政府办公室
二OO七年十一月十日

金华市人才交流会管理办法(试行)
市人事局



第一条 为规范我市人才交流会活动,维护人才市场秩序,根据《浙江省人才市场管理条例》,制定本办法。
第二条 本办法所称人才交流会是指由人才中介服务机构(以下简称中介机构)举办,为用人单位和应聘者之间双向选择提供交流场所以及相关服务的中介活动。凡举办名称冠以“人才”字样,或以专业技术人员、管理人员、大中专毕业生、研究生为主要招聘对象的人才交流活动,应遵守本办法。
第三条 人才交流会分固定性人才交流会和临时性人才交流会。
固定性人才交流会是指中介机构利用固定场所,为用人单位和应聘者之间双向选择提供周期性服务的人才招聘活动。
临时性人才交流会是指中介机构独立或联合其他部门单位,利用自有或临时租用场所,为用人单位和应聘者组织开展的非定期性的人才招聘活动。
第四条 举办人才交流会应当遵守国家法律、法规,坚持平等、自愿、公平和诚实守信的原则,实行单位自主用人,个人自主择业。
第五条 举办人才交流会应经县级以上人事行政部门批准。在金华市区范围内举办的人才交流会,由市人事行政部门负责审批;在县(市)范围内举办的人才交流会,由当地县(市)人事行政部门审批。
第六条 中介机构联合其他部门单位共同举办人才交流会的,中介机构为主办单位,其他部门单位为协办单位或承办单位,主办单位负责办理相关手续,承担主要责任,协办单位或承办单位承担相应连带责任。
第七条 人才交流会实行申请审批制度。举办固定性人才交流会,举办单位须在年底前向人事行政部门申报下一年度拟举办的固定性人才交流会计划。举办临时性人才交流会,举办单位须提前30天向人事行政部门提出申请。
举办单位应将已经批准的固定性人才交流会年度计划或临时性人才交流会批准文件报送工商行政管理部门备案。
第八条 申请举办人才交流会的中介机构须具备下列条件:
(一)持有人才中介服务许可证;
(二)注册资金在30万元(含)以上;
(三)5名以上具有从业资格的专职工作人员;
(四)有与申请举办的人才交流会规模相适应的场所。
第九条 人才交流会的举办单位应向审批机关提交以下材料:
(一)《金华市举办人才交流会申请表》;
(二)《人才中介组织服务许可证》副本及复印件;
(三)拟刊播的广告信息;
(四)人才交流会的组织方案、应急处理预案;
(五)主办单位与会办、协办、承办单位的合作协议;
(六)单位的介绍信和经办人员的身份证;
(七)举办非常设交流会需提供租用场地协议书;
(八)工作人员名单。
第十条 人才交流会的举办单位负责交流会活动的组织实施工作,承担审查招聘单位资质,确保招聘单位提供的岗位信息真实性,保证交流场馆安全,维护招聘现场秩序,监督规范入场单位和个人行为,防止欺诈确保诚信交流等。
第十一条 各行业主管部门为本系统用人单位举办的临时性人才交流活动,应联合或委托中介机构举办,并报人事行政部门批准后组织实施。
第十二条 人事行政部门应当在接到举办人才交流会申请之日起7个工作日内作出是否批准举办的决定。予以批准的,发给《举办人才交流会批准书》;不予批准的,给予申请人书面答复,说明理由。
第十三条 未经人事行政部门批准,举办单位不得发布任何形式的人才交流会广告及相关的招聘广告。
第十四条 人才交流会获人事行政部门批准后,举办单位应持《举办人才交流会批准书》向公安机关报送安全保卫方案,接受公安部门的监督指导。
第十五条 人才交流会获批准后,如需变更内容,举办单位必须重新提出申请并说明理由,人事行政部门应当在5个工作日内做出是否批准的决定。不予批准的,给予申请人书面答复,说明理由。未经批准,不得擅自更改交流会内容。
交流会因故无法按期举办的,举办单位必须按原信息发布渠道提前5日刊登启事,并负责相关善后事宜的处理工作。
第十六条 举办单位应将参加人才交流会的单位登记在册。固定性人才交流会提前5日将参会单位名册报原审批的人事行政部门备案;临时性人才交流会在交流会结束后5日内报原审批的人事行政主管部门备案,并将登记资料保存一年以上。
第十七条 人事、工商、税务、物价、公安、消防、行政执法等部门对人才交流会进行监督、检查、管理。若发现有违规行为,应当立即纠正,并责令改正。
第十八条 违反本办法有关规定的,按照国家和省有关规定予以处罚;构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任。


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